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Abstract. Secure Tropos, an extension of the Tropos methodology, considers 
security requirements alongside functional requirements, from the early stages 
of the system development process. The Secure Tropos language uses security 
concepts such as security constraint, secure goal, secure plan, secure resource, 
and threat to capture the security concepts from both social and organisational 
settings. These concepts are used to model and reason about security for a 
specific system context. This paper presents a CASE tool, called SecTro, which 
supports automated modelling and analysis of security requirements based on 
Secure Tropos. The tool’s architecture, layout, and functionalities are 
demonstrated through a real world example using the Secure Tropos concepts.  
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1   Introduction 
Information systems play an important role in education, health care, banking, and 
transportation. Ensuring security of information systems is a vital and challenging 
task. Such systems often store sensitive customer and business information, which 
needs adequate protection [1]. There should be cost effective and realistic protection 
mechanisms to protect such systems against any potential attack. It is already agreed, 
by the industry and relevant research communities, that security should be considered 
from the early phases of the development process [2]. Identifying and analysing the 
security requirements along with the functional requirements provides a better 
comprehension of the system’s security issues and limits the conflicts between the 
security and functional requirements for more secure information systems [3, 4, 5]. 
Secure Tropos is a security requirements engineering methodology that considers 
security issues throughout the whole development process [6]. The approach 
identifies, models and analyses the security concepts within the organization and 
social settings from the early stages of development. However, considering security 
issues from the early development stage may increase the number of activities during 
the development, which may not be always affordable depending on the project’s 
specific constraints. Therefore, there is the need for an automated tool to support 
security modelling activities based on the Secure Tropos concepts [3]. This paper 
demonstrates a tool, named SecTro, which supports the designers during the security 
modelling activities and assists them in producing the output based on the activities. 
The tool demonstration includes the architecture, the layout, and the functionalities 
based on a real example.   
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 is a review of Secure 
Tropos. Section 3 illustrates the tool that supports Secure Tropos. Section 4 discusses 
the related work, while section 5 concludes the paper and presents future work. 
2   Secure Tropos Methodology 
Secure Tropos is an extension of Tropos methodology that takes security into account. 
Secure Tropos considers the basic Tropos concepts such as dependency, goal, task, 
resource, and capability and adds security concepts such as security constraint, secure 
goal, secure plan, secure resource, and secure capability [3, 6]. Secure Tropos 
includes the following modelling activities: 
 Security reference modelling. The security reference modelling activity 
involves concepts such as the security features of the system under 
development, the protection objectives of the system that contribute 
positively towards the security features, the security mechanisms that 
contribute positively towards the protection objectives, and the threats that 
have a negative contribution towards the security features of the system. The 
security reference diagram can be used as a reference point during the 
development process. 
 Security constraint modelling. Involves the modelling of the security 
constraints imposed to the actors and the system, and it allows developers to 
perform an analysis by introducing relationships between the security 
constraints or a security constraint and its context. 
 Secure entities modelling. Involves the analysis of the secure entities of the 
system and it is considered complimentary to the security constraints 
modelling.  
 Secure capability modelling. Involves the identification of the secure 
capabilities of the actors that guarantee the satisfaction of the security 
constraints.  
In addition, Secure Tropos consists of four stages: 
 Early requirements. Stakeholders are modelled as social actors, which 
depend on each other in order to achieve goals, carry out plans or deliver 
resources. The outcome of this phase is an actor diagram and a number of 
goal diagrams. 
 Late requirements. In the late requirements the actor diagram of the early 
requirements is extended with the introduction of the system to be as an actor 
that has a number of dependencies with the rest of the social actors. In fact, 
these dependencies will be the functional and non-functional requirements of 
the system. 
 Architectural design. According to the system requirements the designer in 
this phase defines the global architecture of the system, which consists of a 
 number of sub-systems. Sub-systems are interconnected with data and 
control flows that are represented as dependencies. Then, each actor is 
assigned to an agent who has a number of capabilities. Usually, during the 
end of the architectural design the security attack testing takes places, where 
the design of the system is tested against the security requirements. 
 Detailed design. In detailed design there is further specification of the agent 
capabilities and the interactions between the agents. Agent capabilities and 
their included plans are modelled with the help of UMLsec activity 
diagrams, while agent interactions are modelled with the help of UMLsec 
sequence diagrams. 
The meta-model of Secure Tropos [8] is shown in Fig. 1 and more detailed 
information about Secure Tropos can be obtained from [3, 6]. 
 
Fig. 1. Secure Tropos metamodel. 
3   The SecTro Tool 
3.1. SecTro Architecture  
The SecTro tool [9, 10] was developed to support the Secure Tropos modeling 
activities for the creation of the visual models and to assist the designers with the 
automation of some aspects of the methodology. It also includes a basic validation of 
the developed models. It is a standalone application that was built with the Java 
programming language, which makes the tool usable across different platforms.  
The package diagram of SecTro is shown in Fig. 2 and a description of the 
packages is given in Table 1. The main classes for the drawing functionalities of the 
tool are shown by a class diagram in Fig.  3. The class diagram of the graphical user 
interface (GUI) package is shown in Fig. 4. All the elements that can be drawn, such 
as an actor and a hard goal, belong to the ElementType class, while all the links 
between the elements, such as “plays” and “satisfies” links, belong to the LinkType 
class.  
 
Fig. 2. Package diagram of SecTro. 
Table 1. Description of the SecTro packages. 
Package Description 
sectro The parent package that includes the main class and all the sub 
packages 
sectro.drawing Contains the generalized class for all the drawing objects 
(DrawingObject) and the elements and links packages 
sectro.drawing.elements Contains the classes for all the drawing elements (Actor, 
HardGoal,Resource, Plan, etc.) 
sectro.drawing.links Contains the generalized class for all the Links (Link) and the 
classes for all the drawing links (LinkDependency, LinkRestricts, 
LinkPlays, etc.) 
sectro.gui Contains all the classes related to the user interface (MainForm, 
ToolBar, MenuBar, etc.) 
sectro.util  Contains all the utility classes (ImageUtil, XMLUtil, FileUtil, etc.) 
  
Fig. 3. Class diagram of the SecTro drawing functionality. 
 
Fig. 4. SecTro GUI class diagram. 
3.2. SecTro Layout 
SecTro’s workspace, as shown in Fig. 5, consists of the drawing canvas in the centre 
of the workspace. The drawing canvas is the space where the designer is drawing the 
models. The drawing area generally automatically expands depending on the 
developing model size. On the top of the workspace, there is a series of tabs for 
showing the developed diagrams for each stage of Secure Tropos. The project 
explorer and the properties panel are on the right side and the toolbox is on the left 
side of the workspace. Apart from the tabs, the project explorer is another way for the 
designer to navigate through the models. Below the project explorer is the properties 
panel that shows information about the properties of a selected element of a model.  
Drawing ObjectDrawing Panel
<ElementType>Link <LinkType>
1
-belongs
*
-has
* 1
Fig. 5. SecTro workspace. 
 The toolbox on the left contains the graphical elements of the Secure Tropos that 
can be added to a model. However, not all elements appear on the toolbox, but only 
the ones that can be used at a specific stage and model. The reason for that is to 
ensure the syntactical correctness of the developing models by preventing the 
designer to add invalid elements. Therefore, the elements of the toolbox change 
according to the tab that is selected. At the bottom of the workspace is the SecTro 
Assistant that shows information and feedback to the designer about his actions. The 
graphical representations of the concepts of Secure Tropos, by the SecTro tool are 
shown in Fig. 6.  
   
Fig. 6. Secure Tropos notation. 
3.3. SecTro Functionalities Supporting the Security Aware Process 
The main functionalities of the SecTro are to support the security modelling activities 
of Secure Tropos. Therefore, the tool enables the designer to perform security 
reference modelling, security constraint modelling, secure entities modelling, and 
secure capability modelling activities. 
To demonstrate the tool functionalities, we use in the rest of the section a real 
world example. The example is about a value added application for UK located bank 
that offers its customers use of smart cards (debit/credit card) to pay for purchases. To 
support that functionality; the bank collaborates with some retailers and the card 
issuer for the smart card based payment infrastructure. Security is an important aspect 
for this application because customer identifiable and sensitive data is handled by the 
participating parties. Based on the above, we identify the following important 
concepts.  
 
Goals: protect personal data, secure processing. 
Actors: customer, application providers (bank, card issuer) and retailer. 
Plans: transaction and purchase detail, and update account balance, request payment 
from the customer account. 
Resources: customer identifiable data, customer accounts information. 
Security Constraints: Only legitimate customer, transfer minimum data. 
Attacker goal: obtain customer data, unauthorised access. 
 
During the early requirements stage the designer constructs the security reference 
diagram, the actor diagram and a number of goals diagrams. Figures 7, 8, and 9 
present screenshots of the aforementioned diagrams created for the purpose of the 
paper. The designer has the option to construct the goal diagrams in the initial actor 
diagram or create a new tab in order to construct a goal diagram separately from the 
actor diagram and the rest of the goal diagrams. 
 
Fig. 7. Security reference diagram. 
   
Fig. 8. Actor diagram. 
  
 
Fig. 9. Goal diagram. 
 
In the late requirements stage the designer constructs the actor diagram with the 
system and the goal diagram of the system. Similarly, the system’s goal diagram can 
be constructed in the actor diagram with the system tab or the designer can choose to 
construct it in the dedicated tab. Figures 10 and 11 present an actor diagram with the 
system and a goal diagram of the system created for the purpose of this paper. 
In the actor diagram with the system the dependencies of the system with the rest 
of the actors are the functional requirements of the system. In the system goal diagram 
the designer specifies what the system needs to do in order to satisfy the requirements. 
The security constraints in the system goal diagram are the security requirements of 
the system. The designer specifies how the system satisfies these security 
requirements through the concepts of secure goal, plan and resource. This process is 
not sequential and the designer can goal back at the actor diagram with the system and 
add more security constraints. The system goal diagram will be updated automatically 
in order to include the new security constraint. 
 Fig. 10. Actor diagram with the system. 
 
Fig. 11. Goal diagram of the System. 
 During the architectural design the architecture of the system is defined. The tool 
enables the designer to construct an architecture style selection diagram where he can 
model different architecture styles and then model how much these architecture styles 
contribute to the security requirements that has identified in the previous stages.  
Finally, in most cases, during the end of the architectural design the security attack 
testing takes places, where the design of the system is tested against the security 
requirements [11]. The tool automatically generates for the designer the security 
attack scenario template and the security test case template where the designer can 
model the attack and the countermeasures (Fig. 12). In the context of Secure Tropos, 
Security Attack Scenario is defined as an attack situation describing the actors of a 
software system and their secure capabilities as well as possible attackers and their 
goals, and it identifies how the secure capabilities of the system’s actors prevent (if 
they prevent) the satisfaction of the attackers’ goals.  
 
Fig. 12. Security attack scenario template. 
3.4. SecTro Additional Functionalities  
Apart from the above-mentioned functionalities the tool provides additional 
functionalities such as checking the correctness of a model. The designer has the 
ability to draw models, but this includes the danger that designers might draw models 
that are not syntactically correct. Thus, the tool prevents a drawing action by the 
designer that is not complying with the syntax of Secure Tropos based on the meta-
model and shows a respective warning notification. Therefore, a specific concept 
within a model cannot link with another concept unless rules are defined within the 
meta-model. This enables the tool to check the correctness of the individual model. 
For example if the developer tries to connect a security constraint with a goal with a 
“contributes” link, the tool will not allow such action because syntactically a security 
constraint connects with a “restricts” link with the goal. Furthermore, the tool checks 
the consistency between models. When changes are made in one model they are 
automatically reflected in the other models. For example, when a name of an actor is 
changed in the early requirements diagrams it is automatically changed in the 
diagrams of the late requirements. 
Complementary to the above-mentioned functionalities is the functionality of the 
SecTro Assistant. It is located at the bottom of the workspace and it has been 
developed to assist designer that are not familiar with Secure Tropos methodology. 
SecTro Assistant provides feedback on designers’ actions, so for example, when a 
specific toolbox button or tab is clicked, it is showing detailed information about the 
concept of the button or about the modelling activity of the stage tab. In addition, 
when the tool has prevented an action by enforcing rule checking on the models, 
SecTro Assistant will show more information about the reason behind the prevention 
of the action. Also, by clicking a button in the SecTro Assistant the designer can see 
parts of the Secure Tropos meta-model that are related to his action.  
Furthermore, to increase the interoperability of the tool, the tool includes a 
functionality that enables the designer to export the developed models in XML 
format.  The output is a .XML file that contains the model in XML format and can be 
used as an input to another tool. 
Last but not least functionalities that SecTro supports are the designer’s options to 
export a model as an image, to print a model, and to customize the workspace. In case 
of exporting a model as an image the designer has the option to choose the extension 
of the output image file according to his preference. While in the case of workspace 
customization, the designer has the option to zoom in and out of the model, to turn the 
grid on or off, to change the background colour of his model, and to hide the panel 
around the drawing canvas in order to create more space for his model development. 
Therefore, we believe the tool is capable to produce models that are required by the 
designer during the secure software development process. It provides a usable 
interface with all the concepts that the designer will need when using the Secure 
Tropos methodology. 
4  Related Work 
Although Secure Tropos is still in research and it is difficult to develop a CASE tool 
for a methodology that is still in research, the i* modelling framework has been out 
for some years and a number of related CASE tools were developed to support it. 
OME [12] is a general, goal or agent oriented modelling and analysis tool and its 
improved version, OpenOME [13], additionally supports aspect oriented engineering 
while it is integrated in Eclipse Integrated Development Environment (IDE), in 
Protégé conceptual modelling environment and other graph editing environments such 
as Microsoft Visio. REDEPEND [14] is a graphical modelling tool that allows the 
developer to build and analyze Strategic Dependency (SD) models and Strategic 
Rationale (SR) models and is a plug-in for Microsoft Visio. The REDEPEND-
REACT [14] tool is an extension of REDEPEND and involves the ability to define 
properties, such as security and efficiency. Also, following some heuristics rules, it 
guides the process of generating an architecture by recommending specific ones. Then 
the candidate architectures can be evaluated against a variety of properties.  TAOM4e 
[15] is also a plug-in for the Eclipse IDE and supports the modelling in tropos 
methodology during all its phases and also generates automatically the code from the 
tropos specification to JADE or jadex implementations. This can be achieved by 
 mapping the tropos meta-model concepts to the target implementation language 
constructs. The GR-Tool [16] is a graphical tool, where the developer can construct 
goal models and run the algorithms that are embedded in the tool for forward and 
backward reasoning. The T-Tool [17] performs model checking of Tropos 
specifications while the ST-Tool [18] is a tool to support an extension of tropos that 
provides trust management process and performs formal analysis of its specifications. 
J-PRiM [19] tool is a plug-in for Eclipse IDE that uses the i* modeling and supports 
the J-PRiM methodology, which is a re-engineering methodology, where the 
specification of the new system starts with the observation of the current system and 
ends with the specification of the system to be. SNet Tool [20] provides an automatic 
transformation of graphical network representations based on the extended i* into 
executable programs. As a result, network scenarios can be simulated and provide 
valuable feedback. HeRA is a tool that incorporates the concept of heuristic 
requirements elicitation and uses for elicitation and analyse of security requirements 
[4].  HeRA uses heuristic rules to represent security related experience and extend 
further to capture the organisational knowledge for identifying security requirements 
[5].   
The aforementioned tools, although they were developed for different ultimate 
purposes, they provide support for the i* modelling framework, which is the 
modelling framework that was adopted by Secure Tropos as well. But, Secure Tropos 
introduces new concepts that none of the previous tools enables their graphical 
representation, i.e. security constraint, secure goal, secure plan, secure resource, and 
secure capability. Also, the previous tools don’t provide support for the modelling 
activities that Secure Tropos introduces, i.e. security constraint modelling, secure 
entities modelling, and secure capability modelling. So, despite the fact that 
experienced users with Secure Tropos can make conventions and use the previous 
tools to construct single diagrams; these tools are not adequate to support the Secure 
Tropos methodology. 
5  Conclusions and Future Work 
This paper presented our effort to develop a CASE tool for the Secure Tropos 
methodology. The tool supports the designers for the security modelling activities in 
particular for elicitation and analysis of early and late requirements.  SecTro aims to 
provide an editor to develop the security models based on Secure Tropos. It has a 
user-friendly interface, which makes it easy to use and assists analysts who are not 
familiar with the methodology, by providing them with information about the 
methodology concepts, stages, and metamodels. Also, it enforces rules and constraints 
and provides valuable feedback on various actions of the designers in an interactive 
way.  The tool has already been used by the students of university of East London to 
model and analyse security issues of a real industry case study. However, the tool 
does not support the modelling activities of the detailed design stage and we consider 
this as future work. In addition, future work includes the extension of the XML 
Schema in order to validate more models of the methodology.  
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